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Introduction – Cloud computing, the 
leasing of computing capacity on an 
unprecedented scale, has transformed the 
way firms use IT. Instead of buying their 
own on-premise servers, firms can rent 
computing power from a third party such 
as Microsoft Azure or Amazon Web 
Service (AWS). An important decision 
of firms today is to decide how to 
allocate investments between cloud 
computing, which allows firms to better 
manage rises and falls in demand, and 
local computing, which accommodates 
the average demand of firms. 
Moreover, there is another element in 
this market—demand correlation—that 
complicates firms’ investment decision. 
Demand correlation means that the 
demands of two firms either move in the 
same direction (positive correlation) or 
the opposite direction (negative 
correlation). In particular, retailers have 
huge computing spikes during holiday 
seasons, and accounting firms needs 
extra computing power during tax 
seasons. Harms and Yamartino (2010) 
argue that even the largest cloud 
provider will not be able to fully resolve 
issues related to these correlations by 
aggregating demand.
i
 Thus, investing 
efficiently requires firms to take into 
account the degree of demand 
correlation. This problem is further 
compounded by the fact that demand is 
largely uncertain.
 
In the past decade, investments in cloud 
computing have increased significantly, 
and are expected to continue to grow. 
Can more competition promote efficient investment in the market for 
cloud computing or in the other markets for flexible resources? My 
recent research develops a new theory of capacity investment in flexible 
and fixed resources and explains the need for far more data on costs 
and demand to speak about the issue of competition in these markets. 
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The worldwide spending on public cloud 
services is expected to reach $47.4 
billion in 2013 and $107 billion in 2017, 
says International Data Corporation 
(IDC). Yet, given the enormous amount 
of investment in cloud computing, the 
literature on the economic effects of 
cloud computing on investments is 
surprisingly thin.
ii
 Most studies instead 
focus on the technical aspects, but cloud 
computing is more than just a 
technological improvement. 
How to promote efficient investment? 
More Competition? – Lam (2015) is the 
first to examine the investment 
incentives of the cloud providers and the 
cloud users under different market 
structures.
iii
 Two important element of 
the model are that first, there are two 
types of resources (cloud vs. local 
computing), and second, demand is 
uncertain and correlated across firms. 
The main result shows that market 
power of the monopolist cloud provider 
distorts investment incentives, while 
competition restores efficiency. 
However, the extent of improvement 
depends critically on investment costs 
and the degree of demand correlation. 
This is because as correlation increases, 
cloud providers either “win big” (when 
the demand realization is high) or “lose 
big” (when the realization is low). 
Providers need to balance the expected 
demand with the cost of investment. 
When investment costs are low, losing is 
cheap and providers tend to invest more 
as correlation increases. Conversely, 
when investment costs are high, 
providers focus more on minimizing the 
cost of losing, and therefore tend to 
invest less as correlation increases. The 
extent to which competition improves 
welfare over the monopoly case will 
then be different, depending on these 
costs and benefits. Specifically, when the 
efficiency advantage of cloud computing 
over local computing is small enough, 
the extent to which investment is 
distorted under monopoly is smaller, and 
hence competition is more likely to be 
effective. 
Data on costs and demand are the key – 
The result implies that information on 
costs and demand in the market for cloud 
computing, for which few data are 
currently available, should be gathered 
as they have important consequences for 
investment. For example, there is still a 
lot of uncertainty on the cost conditions 
in the cloud industry. Although it is 
often argued that the marginal cost of 
producing an extra unit of computing 
power is close to zero, the costs of 
energy consumption, cooling, and 
management of a large server farm are 
far from negligible. 
Some industry experts (see, for instance, 
Jeff Bezos in Stone, 2013) envisioned 
that cloud computing would transform 
today’s IT into a utility.iv Like 
electricity, computing power would then 
be bought and sold at spot prices instead 
of today’s non-contingent prices. Despite 
the additional consideration of firms 
would price high during peak periods 
and low during off-peak periods under 
spot pricing, the main result that 
investments depend on investment costs 
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Broader Applications of the Model: 
electricity and car-sharing – The model 
can be applied to other markets, where 
firms can invest in multiple resources 
(flexible vs. fixed) and demand is 
correlated across firms. For example, in 
the electricity market, firms can 
consume electricity from utility 
companies or install their own electricity 
generators; in car-sharing, people can 
drive their own cars or share with others. 
Moreover, demand is correlated in that 
time and weather are common drivers of 
demands in electricity and car-sharing: 
people consume more electricity in their 
workplace in the daytime, and at home 
in the evening; people most want a taxi 
during busy times and under bad 
weather. Thus, at a more general level, 
my results could also be extrapolated to 
gain a better understanding on incentives 
for vertical integration in these markets. 
Conclusion – Cloud computing 
revolutionizes the Internet economy, but 
its impact on firms’ investment 
incentives has been unclear to 
economists. By providing a pioneering 
analysis of such issue, my model reveals 
that the desirability of introducing 
competition in the market for cloud 
computing depends on investment costs 
and the degree of demand correlation. 
More empirical work on this front is 
needed.
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